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The 1962 Sino-Indian war was a classic of sorts Neither side wanted war 
It was a case of misperceptions and miscalculations 1 which conspired to 
make the 1962 war a sad mistake The causes of India-China conflict were 
many They ranged from early discernible disputes over territory and 
threats to security through more complex questions of national ideology to 
abstract considerations of status m  the international hierarchy of 
power 1 The causes and misperceptions have also been dealt m  detail by 
many scholars and there have been Indian Chinese and Western 
interpretations of the developments which led to 1962 war But this 
author is going to confine the discussions on the possibilities for 
improvement of relations between the two nations with special reference to 
the boundary disputes
'We cannot pretend that the bilateral relations between India and 
China have been good But we want to improve them and we have stretched 
our hands of friendship The issues between us are most difficult and 
emotional Nothing can be solved without basic good will '3 It is 
encouraging to note that an important recent development in contemporary 
international politics is the emerging detente between India and China 
The two countries are engaged in a continuous political dialogue starting 
in 1981 to bring about improvement in their relations The relationship 
between India and China is rather a complex one and therefore the pace of 
development of their relations to find some new directions is also quite 
slow
Despite mutual efforts towards 1984 the Chinese had reached the 
conclusion dismally that there was not much progress in their efforts to
2improve relations with India However, the change of leadership has once 
again brought new hope in Beijing They extended an invitation to Rajiv 
Gandhi again and interlaced it with an offer to reopen the Indian mission 
in Lhasa This seems to be a major decision and China seems to be 
convinced regarding New Delhi's peaceful intentions and lack of desire to 
instigate any kind of mischief m  Tibet
China has been trying to buildup a new image and those who seriously 
study the nuances m  diplomatic moves that are made by Beijing from time to 
time can understand it They are also very keen to show the development 
which has taken place in China They are proud of their achievements and 
want others to have a look at it The Chinese leaders have no Indian 
experience and therefore Zhao Ziang the Chinese Prime Minister will 
appreciate most an opportunity to visit India But it is not possible for 
him to visit India due to protocol The Chinese Prime Minister Zhao En-Lai 
had visited India in 1960 and now it is time for the Indian Prime Minister 
to return the visit during 1986-87 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
appears to be transparently sincere about his intentions to improve 
Sino-Indian relations and will remain until he has had the full taste of 
inter-state treachery
The Chinese government m  Beijing seems to bç sincere about 
improvement of relations with India They did not use 'ifs' and 'buts' 
about the future of India under Rajiv Gandhi as was done by some major 
powers China was also sure about the continuity of leadership after 
elections and did not cultivate the opposition leaders like some important 
countries did 4 China relates itself to the third world m  a manner which
is different from India The emphasis in Beijing is an modernization and
3its responses in international relations are essentially diplomatic 
conciliatory tolerant and accomodating particularly towards countries 
with which China does consider itself in competition But conciliation and 
competetion are policies and not principals so far as China is concerned 
However with the changes taking place m  China and the young leadership 
coming up it is quite likely that some understanding is struck with India 
which also has a team of young leaders headed by the PM Rajiv Gandhi
It is m  the context of this framework that we must look a afresh at 
the problems we have to resolve between ourselves One of the tactical 
mistakes India and China made initially was to treat the border dispute as 
something more than a bilateral conflict This damaged relations between 
India and China and impinged on their links with other countries notably 
the Soviet Union and Pakistan 5 The Chinese looked at Indo-Soviet 
friendship as an impediment to the normalization of relations between India 
and China Similarly, India considered China's friendship with Pakistan as 
a hurdle to a border settlement These attitudes dominated the thinking of 
both countries to such as extent that they failed to recognize the fact 
that India's dependence on Soviet Union and China's tilt towards Pakistan 
were a consequence and not a cause of the border conflict These 
perceptions have, however changed to some extent over the years China is 
no longer insisting that India should wean itslef away from Soviet Union to 
qualify for better Smo-Indian relations Similarly, India no more demands 
further curbing of involvement in Indo-Pak disputes to prove that China's 
intensions are genuine about the border settlement But the shared desire 
to take a more detached look at the bilateral dispute without prejudice to 
relations with other countries, has not removed the remaining barriers to a
4border accord since the two countries still tend to view the matter m  the 
total context of their relations extending to their relative roles in South 
Asia
It is very important to recognize that a border settlement will 
certainly try to erase the impressions of a very painful chapter but cannot 
by itself lead to a revival of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai kind of kinship unless 
the two countries recognize and respect each other's legitimate interests 
It is not that India wants to deny China it's due role m  South Asia so 
long as China's policies and actions do not seek to undermine India s 
primacy m  the subcontinent It is possible for China to be friendly with 
India and Pakistan by steering clear of any involvement in their conflicts 
and controversies Perhaps getting rid of" enemy's enemy is our friend 
syndrome will help China a great deal to carve out a niche for itself m  
the region
It is of some significance to note that even the super powers have 
changed their attitudes U S S R 6 is no longer concerned about 
Sino-Indian normalization where as the US is favorable to the 
reconciliation between the two Asian giants It was the US which was 
carrying on an anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese ideological crusade, that tried 
to involve India m  an anti-China alliance m  the wake of 1962 border 
conflict At the same time, the US was also suggesting India to give up 
Kashmir Valley to befriend Pakistan on the one hand and draw it into a 
wider Asian alliance against China on the other in return for American 
military assistance to meet the threat of renewed Chinese aggressions But 
the US was disappointed Nehru refused to bite the bate and get drawn into 
such an alliance and agree m  the process to a token participation in the
5Vietnam war But the international strategic environment has changed now
India and China being no longer adverse to the idea of a negotiated 
settlement there are chances of normalization but there are still 
formidable obstructions to it Nobody m  India now talks of 1962 
resolutions of the Parliament not to giveup even an inch of ternotory and 
to insist on an unconditional Chinese withdrawal from all occupied areas 
before starting the talks for normalization The Chinese too are not 
threatening to occupy the rest of the territory claimed by them although 
they are not prepared to give up any pare of the disputed area under their 
occupation 7 The Deng Xiao Ping leadership has tried to set the ball 
rolling by making a package offer on the basis of the existing realities 
with China retaining all the areas under its occupation but giving up its 
claim to the rest of the disputed territory The Indian side has also been 
talking of a settlement based on the legitimate interest of both the 
countries in that insisting on a return of all territories under Chinese 
occupation It appears that if negotiations are begun m  all seriousness 
from both the sides there are chances of accomodating the reasonable 
interests of the parties involved But the package deal has been to a great 
extent a non starter because it sought to settle issues on the basis of 
status quo Since China never appeared to be m  a mood to settle the 
border issue in a hurry, India did not seek the development of relations in 
other areas exclusively at the expense of a settlement on the border 
question
After going round and round the mulberry bush the third round of 
talks also failed to provide any results as issues relating to modalities 
and procedures could not be solved It was only m  the 4th round in Delhi
6in October 1983 that some progress was made The two sides discussed and 
exchanged views on international affairs and also agreed to discuss border 
questions sectorwise for which a proposal was earlier mooted by India It 
appeared that it was a step forward Despite this China seemed to be of 
the view that the border problem could be solved only through mutual 
accomodation and not on the basis of unilateral territorial concessions by 
China m  the Western Sector They also believe that India should make 
concessions m  the East and China m  the West at the most but the 'package 
plan' was the best way There have been seven rounds of talks and China 
sought some clarifications about the parameters of the sectorwise talks and 
India has explained the same
India has been of the view that the Chinese package proposal was 
onesided The Chinese desired the status quo to be more acceptable to 
India They felt that mere abandonment of Beijing's remaining territorial 
claims should be a good enough compensation for conceding the territory 
already in its possession They did not realize that India hardly gained 
anything by accepting the defacto position without any countervailing 
concessions The Chinese have been maintaining a sharp presence in Tibet 
facing India They have about 250,000 troops with improved logistical 
position and a vast network of lateral roads all along the border branching 
off from the main Aksai Chin highway running through Tibet to Sinkiang 
which is also connected with the Karakoram highway linking Pakistan The 
Chinese built 8 airfields at Tibet besides laying an oil pipeline and a 
railway line almost halfway from China to Tibet With these facilities 
China can at least sustain 250 000 troops fighting for about a month or >
about 150 000 troops for two months m  another Smo-Indian conflict
7There seems to be no great advantage in accepting the status quo by 
giving the defacto position the halo of de jure recognition There has to 
be a political settlement based on mutual accomodation to end this chapter 
in Smo-Indian relations The historical data produced by the two sides m  
support of their respective claims cannot by themselves end this impasse 
A settlement can be reached only by understanding each others limits for 
making concessions If, as the Chinese agree India's claim to Aksai Chin 
or even the demarcation of the McMohanline was based on treaties or 
conventions imposed by British imperialism, it is equally arguable that the 
Chinese locus standi for claiming the disputed territory stems from its 
own occupation of Tibet 9
Some foreign experts justify the Chinese claim to the occupation of 
Aksai Chin on strategic 10 rather than legal grounds, maintaining that this 
territory was necessary for China to build a road through Tibet to Sinkiang 
which could not be reached otherwise accross the Gobi desert It is not 
generally known that m  addition to Aksai Chin which lies between the 
Karakoram and the Kuenlun ranges on the north, the Chinese had also 
occupied on the southern side of Karakoram, five other areas in Ladakh- the 
whole or parts of Soda Plains LingziTang Changchenmo Valley, Deepsang 
Plains and the area between Lanak La and Dumjor Lá which are at least twice 
as large in area as Aksai Chin and are an integral part of the Indus river 
basin and not of Tibet by any stretch of imagination The Colombo 
proposals put forward in 1963 to help India and China resolve their dispute 
was rejected by China and India has not pressed for the same either
8If the Aksai Chin area is separated and the watershed principle 
applied the Karakoram could be deemed to be reasonable demarcation line 
which would give China all the territory to the north it would need to 
maintain communication link with Smkiang and even Pakistan It would also 
enable India to regain at least one-fourth to one third of the territory 
lost in Ladakh, making the accord acceptable to Indian opinion
The sector by sector talks have not taken off because the two sides 
could not agree on what should be deemed to be marked geographical 
features, like the watershed or the crest of the dividing mountain ranges 
for commencing the sectorwise discussions The Chinese claim in all the 
three sectors extend well into the Indian side of the Himalayas and the 
Karakoram It remains to be seen whether this issue can be sorted out at 
the next round of talks sometime this year m  1986 to clear the way for 
substantive discussions If India and China decide to meet each other s 
requirements it is quite possible that the border settlement comes about 
right in time There should be no hesitation m  India for giving up 
Aksai-Chin by extending the watershed principle to the Karakoram if China 
is prepared to withdraw from the South or this mountain range Similarly, 
the Chinese have no great need for retaining the Chumbi Valley, a wedge 
between Sikkim and Bhutan which is vital for the defence of India's 
North-East region In the Central Sector too, it is possible to arrive at 
an accord taking India's sentiments into consideration since China has no 
need at all for the territory it has already occupied or laid claims to m  
Bara Hoti, Nilang-Jadhang, Sangcha Malla and Lapthal along the Ganga and
Spiti river systems But the Chinese idea of a comprehensive settlement
9is that it should cover the border m  all the sectors from the Karakoram 
along the Himalayas to the tnjunction between India Burma and Tibet But 
India wants the accord to extend to the whole range of mutual political 
relations with China also steering clear of any involvement in 
sub-continental problems leaving India Pak Nepal Bhutan and Bangladesh 
free to settle their differences In other words leaving South Asia to 
India's primacy without detriment to China's right to maintain friendly 
relations with all countries in the region
With a dynamic and forward looking Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi India 
is prepared to negotiate in all sincerity There are no domestic 
compulsions demanding rigid positions in either India or China It is 
hoped that success will not elude both sides for a very long time as the 
times seems to be ripe for a solution As discussed earlier a realistic 
reassessment of the situation will perphaps help m  bringing the two 
nations out of an artificially created emotional atmosthpere The two 
giant nations are capable of providing a mutually agreed solution without 
jeopardising their national prestige and position It is also certain that 
the highest political leadership in both the countries will use imagination 
and demonstrate statesmanship as both these nations believe in the spirit 
of the Boundary Conference and the principles of peaceful coexistence 
Both the countries stand to gain from a settlement at a time when 
consolidation of internal political order and developing their economies 
with simultaneous reduction in their emphasis on military preparedness is 
necessary to create a peaceful regional atmosphere for continued and 
genuine cooperation with the countries of the the third world In the 
context of international security, it is advisable that both these Asian
LO
giants follow the path of cooperation rather than confrontation H  Forces 
which misguided India during the late fifties and after are now closer to 
China and it is up to the Chinese leadership whether they want to be used 
as a card by another power or not India and China must make best possible 
attempts to make sure that they do not tread on each others' corns and come 
into conflict as that would be calamity tor Asia
I
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